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voters of the State to decide whether the right of absolute
change of venue should be extended beyond capital cases
to the more serious non-capital cases, as was the object of
the 1952 legislation, held to be unconstitutional because
the Court felt that the 1875 amendment froze the matter
in that regard pending further constitutional amendment.
It would seem that the Heslop ruling is an obvious interpretation, in view of the fact that the purpose of so
amending the Constitution in 1875 was to put an end to
what were then regarded as abuses of the unlimited right
of removal. It may be now that newly arisen factors make
other changes in order seventy-five years and more after
that amendment.
Thus it is that, as the law now stands, while there is an
absolute right of removal in all civil law cases, there is such
a right only in capital criminal cases, and cause must be
shown and the matter left to discretion of the trial court,
subject to review for abuse, in non-capital criminal cases,
howsoever serious the crime and severe its punishment.

DRIVER HAVING GREEN LIGHT
OF CARE

-

DUTY

Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co.'
The plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant Lee's
taxicab, which was eastbound on Lombard Street in Baltimore City, at the intersection of Light Street. The cab was
standing directly to the south of a streetcar, both vehicles
waiting for the traffic signal to change to green. Lee's vision
to the north on the intersecting street was obscured by the
streetcar, and he could not see the defendant Medlin's auto
which was headed south on Light Street. Lee testified that
he waited for the amber light to clear, and started to move
when the green came on. He was in the act of passing the
streetcar when he was struck by Medlin's auto, and he
testified that he first saw Medlin's auto when it was inches
away, and right before the collision occurred. There was
testimony in the record, not referred to in the opinion, that
Medlin's auto was three feet into the intersection when the
light changed, but this was contradicted by other witnesses
who said Medlin entered the intersection on a red light.
As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was injured and
1

75 A. 2d 97 (Md., 1950).
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sued both Medlin and the taxicab company. The jury found
in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants. Medlin's
negligence was apparently in his failure, while exercising
his statutory2 right to proceed, to take reasonable precautions such as slowing down, blowing his horn, etc., in anticipation that someone such as Lee might come from behind
the streetcar, and there was no appeal on his part. The
lower court granted the defendant cab company's motion
for a judgment "n.o.v." Upon appeal from this judgment,
the Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the verdict for
the plaintiff against the cab company.
The Court of Appeals began its opinion by adverting
to the well established principle that if there is any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient to prove negligence,
the weight and value of such evidence is for the jury, and
pointed out that the same rule applied in passing on the
question of negligence on a motion for judgment n.o.v. The
Court quoted from Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co.,'
as follows:
"'The Court, in deciding whether to grant demurrer
prayers or motions for judgments n.o.v. resolves all
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff and
assumes the truth of all evidence and such inferences
as may naturally and legitimately be deduced theretend to support the plaintiff's right of refrom which
'
covery'. )4
It is up to the jury to decide the question of negligence,
and the Court said Lee's own testimony was sufficient to
send the case to the jury on the question of his own negligence, and could not be brushed aside because it was contradicted by other testimony in the case. If a motorist enters
an intersection "blindly", without anticipating traffic in the
intersection, he is guilty of negligence - whether the light
is green, amber or red. The jury evidently found Lee guilty
of such negligence as to his passenger. In its opinion, the
Court of Appeals said:
"A green light does not give an operator of a motor
vehicle the right to enter an intersection irrespective
2

Md. Code (1951), Art. 66%, Sed. 157.
"(b) Amber alone or 'Caution' when shown following the green or
'Go' signal.
(1) Vehicles facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest

crosswalk at the intersection, but if such stop cannot be made In safety
a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection."
3 190 Md. 528, 59 A. 2d 313 (1948).
1Supra, n. 1, 98. See also: State v. Gosnell, 79 A. 2d 530 (Md., 1951).
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of traffic conditions. An automobile may lawfully be
in the intersection at the time, and it may 'be driven
cautiously through the intersection'. If this were not
so, all traffic in the intersection when the light turns
from green to amber could be trapped by oncoming
traffic which had just been given the green light, or 'Go'
signal. An operator of an automobile, when given the
green or 'Go' signal at an intersection, is required to
use due care and caution to see that traffic in the intersection is such that he can proceed with safety. He
must regard and heed actual traffic conditions, even
though he has a green or 'Go' signal. If a motorist
enters an intersection blindly, without anticipating
traffic in the intersection, he is guilty of negligence.'' 5
Possibly the Court's rather brief treatment of the case
was due to the fact that a passenger in the taxicab was the
plaintiff. If the Court is merely saying that Lee's own statement to the effect that he drove into the intersection when
his view was obscured shows he was negligent in failing to
anticipate the presence of persons who might be lawfully
in the intersection, the opinion seems a sound one. It is
unfortunate, however, that the Court in its opinion did not
refer to Medlin's own testimony, favorable to the plaintiff
(the truth of which would have to be assumed) 6 that he
was three feet into the intersection when the light changed,
which, of course, would place him "lawfully" within the
intersection. It is also unfortunate, in light of appellee's
contention that Medlin was unlawfully in the intersection,
and that therefore the operator of the cab was not under a
legal duty to anticipate that he was actually in the intersection, that the Court should have seen fit to dismiss this
argument with the following statement:
"This argument is too subtle and mystic for this
court to consider. Medlin's automobile was not a phan-7
tom, it was really and actually a physical automobile.
This somewhat cursory treatment of the case, coupled
with the above statement, seems to leave some room for
doubt as to whether the opinion might not be construed as
saying that Lee was negligent, regardless of whether Medlin
was lawfully in the intersection or not. However, from the
facts of the case, the truth of all of which favorable to the
5
8

Supra, n. 1, 99.
Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 1, 100.
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plaintiff would have to be assumed, it could be found that
Medlin was lawfully within the intersection. The cab
driver's testimony was silent on the point, and Medlin's
own testimony was to the effect that he was three feet into
the intersection when the light changed. Consequently, in
all likelihood, the Court of Appeals in merely saying that
under these circumstances, the question of Lee's negligence
was for the jury.
The question of whether Lee was negligent even if it
were clearly established that Medlin was unlawfully in the
intersection, must, of course, await determination until it is
before the Court on undisputed evidence, or in some form
requiring a ruling on that issue.
What should the extent of Lee's duty be? The Maryland
Code provides that when the motorist is given the green or
"Go" signal, he must "yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection
at the time such signal is exhibited."' The Courts agree
that traffic awaiting the green or crossing signal on intersecting streets must first ascertain whether the intersection
is clear before starting to cross.9 Not to do so is negligence."0
The motorist is under a duty to be vigilant and watch for
vehicles that might cross his path." The general rule is
that a green light or a favorable signal gives a motorist
no more than a qualified permission to cross, the qualification being two-fold: (1) he must permit traffic lawfully in
the intersection to complete its crossing, and (2) he must
proceed with due care.
Just what is meant by due care, is, of course, often difficult to define, and must depend largely on the circumstances
of each case. The instant case is supported by prior Maryland authority and by authority elsewhere in its conclusion that a driver must exercise special care in entering an
intersection where his view is obscured. This is particularly
8

Md. Code (1951), Art 66%, Sec. 157 (a)

(1).

Italics supplied.

92 BLASHFI LD CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW (Perm. Ed., 1951), Sec.
1005, p. 254, n. 17.
10Maryland holds that a violation of a statute is evidence of negligence,
where such violation is the proximate cause of the accident. Hochschild
Kohn & Co. v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276, 66 A. 2d 780 (1949) ; Meese v. Goodman,
167 Md. 658, 176 A. 621 (1934) ; Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321,
125 A. 782 (1924) ; B. & 0. R.R. Co. v. State, 169 Md. 345, 181 A. 830 (1935).
1In Sklar v. Southcomb, 194 Md. 626, 630, 72 A. 2d 11 (1950), the defendant proceeded on a green light and hit the plaintiff's car which was being
driven through a red light while in a funeral procession. The Court said:
"Even though the light was in his favor, he was under an obligation
to yield the right of way to vehicles already in the intersection."
The Court cited U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Md. 24, 190
A. 768 (1937), a case in which the car already in the intersection was lawfully there.
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true if he is passing other traffic that is failing to proceed
despite a favorable signal. Thus, in Sklar v. Southcomb, 2
cited by the instant case, a driver, having a green light, but
whose view was obscured and who passed other vehicles
who were stopped, despite the green light, was held guilty
of negligence. Maryland, in Longenecker v. Zanghi, s has
previously held that when vision is obscured by a building,
the driver's duty increases to a degree commensurate with
the greater danger.
That this duty will not be carried to unreasonable
lengths is indicated by the decision in Larsen v. Brenan,'4
which held that a motorist having a favorable light was
under no duty to stop his car and peer around the corner
to see whether motorists having unfavorable signals would
obey them.
On the question of whether Lee was negligent if it had
been clearly established that Medlin was unlawfully in the
intersection, consideration should be given to decisions involving collisions between favored and unfavored drivers
at intersections where the view is not obscured, or where
there are no other factors to warn the favored driver. In
Sun Cab Co. v. Faulkner,5 the defendant cab, having a
green light, entered an intersection at an excessive rate of
speed, and collided with another cab which entered at the
same time on a red signal. The Court held that the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff (his passenger) because
" See Sklar v. Southcomb, ibid; and Capillon v. Lengsfleld, 171 So. 194,
197 (La. Ap., 1936), in which the defendant, with a green light, but whose
view was obscured by other cars waiting for the light to change, proceeded,
and collided with plaintiff; the Court said:
"Reasonable prudence and care required that he tarry until he was
in a position to see whether the roadway was clear . . ., especially, in
view of the fact that the traffic, adjacent to him and proceeding in the
same direction, had not moved forward but was ostensibly waiting
until the roadway was clear of traffic."
In Shea v. Judson, 283 N. Y. 393, 28 N. E. 2d 885, 887 (1940), the Court
said:
"Even though (the driver) was authorized to proceed in the face of
the green light, if he observed (the car with which he had collided) in
and conditions were such that, in the exercise of
the intersection ...
ordinary prudence, he ought to have made such an observation, he was
not authorized to proceed blindly and wantonly without reference to
the (other) car but was bound to use such care as to avoid the collision
as an ordinarily prudent man would have used under the circumstances.
Under all the circumstances of the case, it was for the jury to determine
whether he exercised such care as was required of an ordinarily prudent
man, though having in mind the fact that the lights gave him the right
of way."
See also: Tooke v. Muslow Oil Co., 183 So. 97 (La. Ap., 1938).
175 Md. 307, 2 A. 2d 20 (1938).
"54 So. 2d 337 (La. Ap., 1951).
163 Md. 477, 163 A. 194 (1932).
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the collision resulted, not from his excessive speed, but
from the disregard of the signal by the other cab. The Court
said that even though the defendant was negligent in speeding, his negligence was not the proximate cause of the collision. The Court said:
"The case is unlike those in which, there being no
signals, by lights or by traffic officers, two drivers approaching each other on intersecting streets have the
burden of determining which has the right to cross
unobstructed by the other. In those cases there is commonly a question of the exercise of due care on the
part of one driver or the other in deciding to cross when
he did, but in the present case no such question is
present....
If negligence is found in the rate of speed at which
the Sun cab was being driven, that fact alone does not,
of course, answer the question of liability. The negligence must have been the cause of the collision....
There would be no foundation in fact here for holding
that by driving at a reduced speed the Sun Company
driver might have avoided the collision after the two
cabs came within sight of each other. The contribution
of the Sun cab to the accident appears to have been
only that of being there at the moment, a circumstance
which might have arisen with or without negligence in
approaching the place. But taking it as proved that
there was negligence in the rate of speed in this instance, that negligence, in the approach, must be found
to have been the cause of the collision, or there can be
no legal
responsibility for it on the Sun Company's
' 16
part.'
The above quotation from the Faulkner case was used in
4 Md. L. Rev. 207, a casenote on Greenfield v. Hook,'
entitled "'Boulevard Stop' Streets in Maryland", which
pointed out that the law relating to the right of way at
intersections controlled by traffic lights (and other forms
of signals) is sharply differentiated from the right of way
law at uncontrolled intersections. At controlled intersections, the driver having the green light or "Go" signal, and
whose vision is unobscured and who has no other warning,
seems to have almost an absolute right of way, and this
without regard to his speed. Monumental Motor Tours, Inc.
Ibid, 478-9.

17177 Md. 116, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939).
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v. Becker,18 followed the Faulknercase, and held the favored
driver not guilty of negligence, despite the fact that he was
speeding. The Court said:
"While relying upon the protection which the traffic
sign was intended to afford for his right of way, the
bus driver had no reason to anticipate and guard against
such contingencies as those to which the accident in this
case must be attributed, and to which the speed of the
bus had no relation."' 19
The case of Pegelow v. Johnson,0 pointed out that it was
not negligence for a favored driver to assume that a driver
of an unfavored highway marked by a stop sign will stop
2
and allow him to proceed. Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt,
22
repeated the language of Greenfield v. Hook, and made
clear that if the favored driver had to slow down at every
intersection the great sums of money spent in building
through highways "to accommodate the great volume of
automobile traffic which is so indispensable a part of modern
life"23 would be largely wasted. The Court also said that
the duty of the unfavored driver to stop and yield the right
of way should be positive and inflexible, so that the favored
driver might safely exercise the privilege of uninterrupted
travel which the statute gives. This result was reached
even though the driver on the favored highway was faced
with a "Slow, Dangerous Corner" sign. In Sonnenburg v.
Monumental Motor Tours, 24 the Court said: "The favored
driver on a boulevard is not his brother's keeper", in a case
where there was evidence of terrific speed on the part of
the favored bus driver, and he testified that he knew the
intersection was dangerous.
An analysis of these cases leads to the conclusion that
under normal circumstances, the driver on the favored
highway has a right to rely on the assumption that the unfavored driver, whom the favored driver sees, will obey
the traffic signal, and the favored driver may proceed accordingly, without the necessity of slowing down. Such
- 165 Md. 32, 166 A. 434 (1933).
IbiL, 36.
2 177 Md. 345, 9 A. 2d 645 (1939). See also: Keir v. Trager, 134 Kan. 505,
7 P. 2d 49 (1932) ; Dikel v. Mathers, 213 Iowa 76, 238 N. W. 615 (1931);
Lucas v. Andress, 17 La. App. 329, 136 So. 207 (1931).
187 Md. 174, 49 A. 2d 537 (1946), (Markell and Delaplaine dissenting).
See also, to the same effect: State v. Gosnell, 79 A. 2d 530 (Md., 1951), a
case where the favored driver was racing, and Baltimore Transit Co. v.
O'Donovan, 78 A. 2d 647 (Md., 1951).
2Supra,
n. 17.
2Supra,n. 21, 179.
-81 A. 2d 617, 620 (Md., 1951).
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an assumption is a necessity in order to speed the flow of
traffic on our expensive through highways, and through
traffic lights. It seems unlikely that the Court of Appeals,
in the instant case, means to qualify or cast any doubt on
the favored driver's right to rely on the above assumption,
in the ordinary case where his view is unobscured, and he
has no other warning of possible danger. Probably the
Court of Appeals is merely reiterating what has long been
the rule, and saying that where the favored driver acquires
knowledge of danger, he is bound to exercise the care of
an ordinarily prudent person; 5 that where his view is
obscured, or he has other warning of danger, he must use
a degree of care commensurate with the greater danger,
and proceed with caution; that he cannot proceed blindly
through an intersection, in disregard of obvious indications
of danger, and in disregard of the rights of those who may
be lawfully within the intersection. The question which
seems still to need an unequivocal answer is whether this
increased duty of care on the favored driver's part can be
extended to make him negligent when he collides with a
person who is clearly and undeniably unlawfully within the
intersection.

THE EFFECT OF A PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION
IN A LIBEL SUIT
Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Services'
Employee, plaintiff, brought a libel suit against his corporate employer and its general manager, defendants, in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The plaintiffappellant was discharged for misconduct while being employed in the defendant-appellee's food store in the meat
department. The general manager of the defendant corporation set forth the incidents of misconduct in letters to the
plaintiff and in memoranda to the directors of the corporation. Judgment was entered for the defendants at the close
of the plaintiff's case, on their motions for directed verdicts,
and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that
the testimony as to publication, even if privileged, plus the
republication of the alleged libelous material in the defendant's plea of justification made out a prima facie case of
25 BLAsHTELD,

op. cit., 8upra, n. 9, §1028, p. 307.

187 A. 2d 831 (Md., 1952).

